INTRODUCTION
Transparency and open data are 'a powerful tool to help reform public services, foster innovation and empower citizens', said the Prime Minister in an open letter to Cabinet Ministers in July 2011.1 In the same year, the Coalition Government held a consultation, 'Making Open Data Real',2 to explore how it might 'best embed a culture of openness and transparency in our public services'. 'Open data' extends to the public courts: one of the Government's new commitments was to publish information about criminal justice: anonymised sentencing data, information about the performance of probation services and prisons, and national crime mapping. More recently, the Ministry of Justice set out an open data strategy for 2012-15, covering both civil and criminal courts.3 To some extent, this 'culture of openness' mirrors the judicial consideration given to open justice, which allows justice to 'be seen to be done'4 and accountability of court proceedings.
Civil courts have been given scant attention in the Cabinet Office consultation and the Government's wider open data project, despite the media and political attention given to civil issues, such as litigation costs and family law. In this paper, I will consider the ongoing public debate around defamation and privacy civil litigation and argue that legal researchers and other interested members of the public are in fact confronted with inaccessible and 'closed' data about public court cases when attempting to analyse the issues at play. Furthermore, as will be shown through an examination of various case law sources, the reasons for this opacity are not necessarily logical: the open justice principle makes the source data theoretically available, but it is not publicly accessible in a useful form. The data has not been deliberately closed from public view, but there appears to be no way for the public to access it. It is as if it is stored in a public filing cabinet with no drawer handles or labels. This is detrimental to policy-making and the legal reform process, which often relies on academic research and journalism during consultation stages, as is well documented elsewhere. For example, the independent 'fact-checking' organisation FullFact was partly born out of its director's belief that 'policy can be distorted by inaccurate claims', following his experiences as a researcher in the House of Lords.5 The organisation argued as part of its evidence submitted to the Leveson Inquiry6 that 'open justice in this century must mean more than merely being able to walk into the courtroom', and highlighted concerns about public access to sentencing remarks. The organisation was not able to check an 'eye-catching claim' made in the press about a judge's decision in a criminal case.7 In its view,
The more direct access to official sources is made easy, the greater the social pressure for good journalism. Moreover, having official and primary sources available online provides a foundation from which assessable and trustworthy journalism can be built up.
Similarly, this short paper argues that more direct access to official sources of data about libel and privacy data will improve the public debate, and the journalism and academic research which informs it. Additionally, it should be borne in mind that the courts data-cases in court and claims-represent only the 'tip of a very large iceberg', as Eric Barendt et al identified in the mid-1990s in relation to publishers' libel experiences.10 For media organisations and small online publishers, including social media users, the reach of libel and privacy is far wider than the cases that make it to court: there are unofficial warnings, letters before action, and of course the anticipated threat of a claim, even if it does not materialise.
The first section of this paper considers the availability of public data around defamation and its role in informing the libel reform process and media coverage. The second section then examines privacy law and the body of data around interim privacy injunctions. The third section reflects on information about the costs of defamation and privacy litigation. In conclusion, it will be suggested that a lack of public case data about defamation and privacy litigation, indicated by the Impact Assessment on the Defamation Bill 2012 and the report by the Master of the Rolls' Committee on Super-Injunctions, hampers the policy-making process, public debate and academic research around these issues of public interest. The patchy data in this area is of particular concern because a new system of arbitration could be introduced as a result of the recommendations made by Lord Justice Leveson at the end of 2012, as an alternative to civil court proceedings.11 Additionally, in the long term, it would be useful to monitor changes to litigation activity brought about by the new Defamation Act 2013, as suggested in the Impact Assessment on the Bill. Judgments, Judgment by Default, Trials, Interlocutory Applications for Master). These outcomes may not necessarily relate to the number of new claims issued: they could include hearings of claims from one or more years previously. With regard to defamation cases specifically, we are told that the total number of claims issued in each claim value bracket (£15,000-£50,000 or over £50,000 or Unspecified), but not given a breakdown of outcomes, beyond the overall figures.12 As a result, an official number of defamation trials is not recorded. Jaron Lewis, who until recently led Reynolds Porter Chamberlain's media group, has compiled a table of these statistics for 1990-2011.13
These figures suggest that of the claims that make it to court, only a fraction have a reported outcome. 'During the course of our inquiry we asked for information on the number of cases challenged on the grounds of jurisdiction and the success rate of such challenges. We have been provided with no such information and it was not clear who would be responsible for collecting it.'27 As a result, it recommended as follows:
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derogation from open justice, as the proceedings and judgments, subject to necessary redactions, remain in public view'.53
Gideon Benaim has since raised a concern that 'allowing the publication of the fact that an injunction has been granted, together with basic facts about the specific case … creates publicity and hysteria about who the person seeking the injunction is, and also encourages online speculation fuelled by those in the know'.54 In his view, transparency issues 'can be dealt with easily by a periodic release of statistical information on the number of injunctions, the type of injunction, the sex of the claimant and the type of subject matter (whether medical, sex, child etc)'. These releases could also include information 'such as whether there was a media defendant, whether the public interest was argued, and whether the claimant was a politician, businessperson or some other well-known person'. He argues:
It isn't necessary to publish information about specific cases contemporaneously, nor to publish to the world at large at any time the 'not so basic' details of a specific case, in the way that the courts have started to do. The Practice Direction can be amended to oblige practitioners to provide the required basic information to a central office in the High Court.
Transparency is possible through statistics without needing to draw attention to individuals at the time they obtain the injunction.55
While Benaim's proposal sounds sensible, there are associated problems to tease out. For example, he contends: 'In reality the media never made an application to discharge a "super-injunction"-despite the fact that they were fully aware of their terms (having been served with each one)'. But how does he-and researchers-definitively know that in the absence of data before mid-2011? Since the judiciary does not even know how many 'super-injunctions' (as defined in Lord Neuberger's report) there were, or the basic details of them, it is difficult to verify that fact at source. Instead, researchers rely on lawyers or members of the media sharing details that are difficult or impossible to check at the courts. It seems likely that information does come out this way, but it is a fallible and inadequate means of accountability. Bill: an absence of official collated statistics and detailed evidence from the parties involved in defamation and privacy litigation.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article has identified large gaps in information concerning the number and type of privacy and defamation cases, and has attempted to set out some of the contributory reasons for this 'closed data'. 59 Ibid, para 216.
Similarly, David Howarth identified an absence of data on defamation costs-a point which can also be extended to data on privacy costs. As indicated by a number of recent reports-some partly instigated by a short supply of data-there is widespread concern about the lack of evidence in this field, which has an effect on related procedural and statutory legal reform. 'Closed data' on defamation and privacy litigation, indicated by the Impact Assessment on the Defamation Bill 2012 and the report by the Master of the Rolls' Committee on Super-Injunctions, damages the policymaking process, public debate and academic research around these issues of public interest. This is particularly significant as policy-makers attempt to devise mechanisms around Lord Justice Leveson's recommendations for a new arbitration service to resolve civil complaints.65 Furthermore, without changes to the way data is collected and collated, it will be impossible to monitor the effect that the new Defamation Act 2013 has on litigation activity, once its provisions are in force.
The various concerns of and recommendations made by the committees discussed above need to be taken seriously by Government as part of its open data initiative, which should not only focus on criminal law. Data on civil litigation, costs, type and detail of cases also needs to be carefully monitored and made available to the legal profession, journalists and researchers, as well as the wider public, in a cost-efficient and practical way. This heightened accountability should not impede the courts' administration of justice66 but will ensure, for example, that members of the public are able to easily access an official figure concerning the number of libel trials that have taken place, rather than an estimate or supposed number. As it stands, we know very little information about the very tip of the defamation and privacy iceberg. 65 At the time of writing, both the Government's Draft Royal Charter and a charter drafted by a group of newspaper publishers contained varying provisions for a new arbitration service. 66 Cf the Lord Chief Justice's comments about cameras in court at his annual press conference, 27 September 2012, transcript available at www.judiciary.gov.uk/media/media-releases/2012/lcj-press-conference-2012. He said: '[A]ny further changes to the system will have to be examined with only one single criterion in mind, and that is whether by letting the cameras into that part of the process, the administration of justice is likely to suffer.'
